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Saudi Arabia and War against Houthis in Yemen |
10 January 2010
Politic
Foreign Policy Department / Middle East and Persian Gulf Studies Group
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Abstract
The sixth round of disputes between Houthis and Yemeni government began in August 2009. Houthis have taken their name from their spiritual leader, Badreddin al- Houthi. Their relationships with Yemeni government were very good until 2003. In that year, when Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Yemeni president visited Northern regions, was welcomed by "Believing Youth" (Al-Shabab al-Muminin) – separated from Hizb-ul-Haq led by Hussein and Yahia Houthi. But, Houthis began their dispute with government when security forces raided the house of Hussein al- Houthi, the former Houthis' representative in Yemeni Parliament and their leader, to arrest him. He had harshly criticized the government regarding the bad economic and social situation of Northern regions. Hussein al-Houthi was killed in the first round of disputes and his brother Abadul – Malik al – Houthi took over the leadership during the subsequent five rounds of conflicts. The recent fightings should be considered the continuation of a dispute which began in 2004 and its main causes are unemployment, poverty and severe economic and social problems in Yemen and especially in its Northern regions.
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Result
The sixth round of disputes between Houthis and Yemeni government began in August 2009. Houthis have taken their name from their spiritual leader, Badreddin al- Houthi. Their relationships with Yemeni government were very good until 2003. In that year, when Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Yemeni president visited Northern regions, was welcomed by "Believing Youth" (Al-Shabab al-Muminin) – separated from Hizb-ul-Haq led by Hussein and Yahia Houthi. But, Houthis began their dispute with government when security forces raided the house of Hussein al- Houthi, the former Houthis' representative in Yemeni Parliament and their leader, to arrest him. He had harshly criticized the government regarding the bad economic and social situation of Northern regions. Hussein al-Houthi was killed in the first round of disputes and his brother Abadul – Malik al – Houthi took over the leadership during the subsequent five rounds of conflicts. The recent fightings should be considered the continuation of a dispute which began in 2004 and its main causes are unemployment, poverty and severe economic and social problems in Yemen and especially in its Northern regions.
Yemen from Saudis' Point of View
The year 2000 was a turning point in relations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen as well as Saudis' stance towards this country. The most important reason for this is the signature of Jeddah agreement which ended six decade differences between the two countries over disputed territories and boundaries. In addition, after the end of seccionist wars, Yemeni democracy declined. These factors led the Saudi government to abandon the policy of opposing Yemen and to support the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Therefore, contrary to seccionist wars in 1994, the Saudi government supported the incumbent government in Yemen in its fight against Houthis.
The direct intervention of Saudi Arabia in Yemeni civil war pose some questions about the adoption of this policy and especially accusing Iran of interfering in Yemen's domestic affairs. In this regard, the following points are of great importance:
Yemen's population is 22 millions and more than 45% of which are Zaidis, the closest shia sect to Sunni thoughts. The rest are Shafeis, a Sunni sect with some affinity to Shia. Since long time ago, these two sects have coexisted in Yemen because of their religious affinity.
Given the belief system of Zaidis, for them Imam Khomeini had all required criteria to be considered a spiritual leader. For this reason, their advocacy for Imam Khomeini and the Islamic revolution is a doctrinal fact which contrary to Saudis' claims doesn't need for Iran's provocation and assistance. In addition, Zaidis have sentiments and thoughts which are too close to twelve Imams Shia and this fact opposes them to Wahhabites and Salafists, and makes them closer to Iran. It is worth mentioning that the two Houthi organizations Hizbul Haq and Al-Shabab al-Muminin, have been formed to counter the spread of Salafism and the activities of Saudi Arabia, therefore, there is no likelihood for their cooperation with Wahhabite Salafis and al-Qaeda.
Furthermore, government and society in Yemen are structurally different from government and society in Soudi Arabia. In Yemen, the social system is a tribal system in which tribe plays a major role and the laws governing tribes are in many cases superior to state laws. Therefore, in Yemen, the government is much weaker than society and the governing tribal system but in Saudi Arabia, Saudi tribal system has led the society towards a non-tribal system and has transformed the government into a large tribe that all people should identify themselves with it. Thus, there is a gap between the two countries in terms of their respective government and society. Feeling threatened by the spread of tribalism, Saudi Arabia tends to weaken Houthis. On the other hand, according to many existing criteria, Yemen is considered a failed state. Based on a report published by UNDP in 2009, the unemployment rate in Yemen is 28% and 57% of the unemployed people are in the young age group. Also, 12/6 million people in Yemen are living under the poverty line, which constitutes 59/95% of its total population. In fact, the grave economic situation of Yemen is one of the main factors contributing to rebels and insecurity in this country. In an interview with a Lebanese newspaper, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Houthis, leader, declared that our difference with the government is not related to religion, rather we are dissatisfied with grave economic situation and unappropriate subsistence situation of people. Given the fact that Ali Abdullah Saleh and many other elites in the government are the followers of the Zaidi sect, the remarks made by Abdul Malik Houthi seems plausible.
In this regard, we should also bear in mind that Saudi Arabia as the world largest oil exporter enjoying huge financial power and wealth and the richest country in the Arab world is the neighbor of Yemen that is the poorest country in the Arab League; this gap, also, is one of the other factors leading to abnormality in Saudi – Yemen relations. This made Saudis fearful of the spread of insecurity from Yemen to their country and motivated their intervention for oppressing Houthis.
In addition to what said above, Saudi Arabia interprets major regional developments in its own terms. The fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq made Iraqi Shiites more powerful through the implementation of democratic mechanisms, and broke down Sunnis power. Saudi Arabia also faces similar challenges in other Middle East countries like Lebanon which in the past considered it as its backyard.
These developments made Saudis fearful of being surrounded by Shias. Therefore, increasing Zaidis' power in Yemen triggered an unprecedented reaction against them.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is the major social base of al-Qaeda in the region. According to the analysis of intelligence services involved in struggling against al-Qaeda, although the main centers of al-Qaeda are located in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia are the potential bases for this terrorist organization. This has brought about serious concerns in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government worries about the return of al-Qaeda and the reoccurrence of terrorist bombing in 2003 and 2004, but this time, from Yemeni territory. Saudis believe that given the weakness of the Yemeni government and the tribal structure of Yemeni society, this country could be a potential place for al-Qaeda activities. Saudi intervention in war against Houthis aims at helping the Yemeni government to control its fragile situation and to prevent al-Qaeda from penetrating into this country.
With the beginning of a new round of clashes, the Yemeni government and also Saudi Arabia accused Iran of supporting Houthis in order to weaken the Yemeni government, to restore Imamat system in the country and to expand its influence in it, however, they could not provide any evidence to prove their claims. In explaining Iran's concerns regarding this human crisis, a few points should be noted.
Crisis in Yemen and Saudi attack on the North of the country have created a human crisis which should be quickly addressed. Iran has made efforts in two ways:
1) contributing to peaceful settlement of crisis and stopping the killing of innocent people; and 2) attracting the attention of international community to the violation of human rights and inhuman consequences of Saudi Arabia's war against innocent people. In fact, Iran's stance is based on a humanitaricen attitude towards more than 9 million people who are the target of bullets, missiles and bombs. Iran aims at stopping killings and peacefully resolve the social and subsistence problems of Zaidis.
Conclusion:
War in Yemen is a serious crisis for regional peace and stability in the region and its continuation may create sectarian disputes (among Shias and Sunnis) all over the Middle East region. Following Saudi Arabia's interference in war, the crisis took more extensive dimensions threatening stability and security of the region. To end the hostilities and to peacefully resolve the Yemeni crisis, it should be viewed from two points of view:
First, the necessity and importance of struggling against al-Qaeda and its increasing influence in Arabian Peninsula, threats directed at the security of regional countries, and dangers existing in the way of energy export through the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. From this point of view, the necessity of cooperation and coordination among regional countries to resolve the crisis and to prevent al – Qaeda and terrorist organizations from expanding their power throughout the region.
Second, the necessity of cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia which is one of the most effective ways for resolving the crisis and preventing its unfavorable consequences for other parts of the Middle East.
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